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ABSTRACT
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) have become one of the
most successful frameworks for unsupervised generative modeling.
As GANs are difficult to train much research has focused on this.
However, very little of this research has directly exploited game-
theoretic techniques.We introduce Generative Adversarial Network
Games (GANGs), which explicitly model a finite zero-sum game
between a generator (G) and classifier (C) that use mixed strategies.
The size of these games precludes exact solution methods, therefore
we define resource-bounded best responses (RBBRs), and a resource-
bounded Nash Equilibrium (RB-NE) as a pair of mixed strategies
such that neitherG orC can find a better RBBR. The RB-NE solution
concept is richer than the notion of ‘local Nash equilibria’ in that
it captures not only failures of escaping local optima of gradient
descent, but applies to any approximate best response computations,
including methods with random restarts. To validate our approach,
we solve GANGs with the Parallel Nash Memory algorithm, which
provably monotonically converges to an RB-NE. We compare our
results to standard GAN setups, and demonstrate that our method
deals well with typical GAN problems such as mode collapse, partial
mode coverage and forgetting.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [14] are a framework in
which two neural networks compete with each other: the generator
(G) tries to trick the classifier (C) into classifying its generated
fake data as true. GANs hold great promise for the development of
accurate generative models for complex distributions, such as the
distribution of images of written digits or faces. Consequently, in
just a few years, GANs have grown into a major topic of research
in machine learning. A core appeal is that they do not need to rely
on distance metrics [22]. However, GANs are difficult to train and
much research has focused on this [1, 2, 38]. Typical problems are
mode collapse in which the generator only outputs points from
a single mode of the distribution and partial mode coverage in
which the generator only learns to represent a (small) subset of
the modes of the distribution. Moreover, while learning the players
may forget: e.g., it is possible that a classifier correctly learns to
classify part of the input space as ‘fake’ only to forget this later
when the generator no longer generates examples in this part of
space. Finally, when learning via gradient descent one can get stuck
in local Nash equilibria [32].
We introduce a novel approach that does not suffer from local
equilibria: Generative Adversarial Network Games (GANGs) formu-
late adversarial networks as finite zero-sum games, and the solu-
tions that we try to find are saddle points in mixed strategies. This
approach is motivated by the observation that, considering a GAN
as a finite zero-sum game, in the space of mixed strategies, any
local Nash equilibrium is a global one. Intuitively, the reason for
this is that whenever there is a profitable pure strategy deviation
one can move towards it in the space of mixed strategies.
However, as we cannot expect to find such exact best responses
due to the extremely large number of pure strategies that result for
sensible choices of neural network classes, we introduce Resource-
Bounded Best-Responses (RBBRs), and the corresponding Resource-
Bounded Nash equilibrium (RB-NE), which is a pair of mixed strate-
gies in which no player can find a better RBBR. This is richer than
the notion of local Nash equilibria in that it captures not only fail-
ures of escaping local optima of gradient descent, but applies to any
approximate best response computations, including methods with
random restarts, and allows us to provide convergence guarantees.
The key features of our approach are that:
• It is based on a framework of finite zero-sum games, and as such it
enables the use of existing game-theoretic methods. In this paper
we focus on one such method, Parallel Nash Memory (PNM).
• We show that PNM will provably and monotonically converge
to an RB-NE.
• It enables us to understand existing GAN objectives (WGAN,
Goodfellow’s training heuristic) in the context of zero-sum games.
• Moreover, it works for any network architectures (unlike previ-
ous approaches, see Related Work). In particular, future improve-
ments in classifiers/generator networks can directly be exploited.
We investigate empirically the effectiveness of PNM and show
that it can indeed deal well with typical GAN problems such as
mode collapse, partial mode coverage and forgetting, especially
in distributions with less symmetric structure to their modes. At
the same time, a naive implementation of our method does have
some disadvantages and we provide an intuitively appealing way to
deal with these. Our promising results suggest several interesting
directions for further work.
2 BACKGROUND
We defer a more detailed treatment of related work on GANs and
recent game theoretic approaches until the end of the paper. Here,
we start by introducing some basic game-theoretic notation.
Definition 1. A strategic game (also ‘normal-form game’), is a
tuple
〈D, {Si }ni=1 , {ui }ni=1〉, where D = {1, . . . ,n} is the set of
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players, Si is the set of pure strategies for player i , and ui : S → R
is i ′s payoff function defined on the set of pure strategy profiles
S := S1 × · · · × Sn . When the set of players and their action sets
are finite, the strategic game is finite.
A fundamental concept in game theory is the Nash equilibrium
(NE), which is a strategy profile such that no player can unilaterally
deviate and improve his payoff.
Definition 2 (Pure Nash equilibrium). A pure strategy profile s =
⟨s1, . . . , sn⟩ is an NE if and only if ui (s) ≥ ui (
〈
s1, . . . , s ′i , . . . , sn
〉)
for all players i and s ′i ∈ Si .
A finite game may not possess a pure NE. A mixed strategy of
player i is a probability distribution over i’s pure strategies Si .
The payoff of a player under a profile of mixed strategies µ =
⟨µ1, . . . , µn⟩ is defined as the expectation:
ui (µ ) :=
∑
s ∈S
[
∏
j ∈D
µ j (sj )] · ui (s).
Then an NE in mixed strategies is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Mixed Nash equilibrium). A µ is an NE if and only
if ui (µ ) ≥ ui (
〈
µ1, . . . , s ′i , . . . , µn
〉) for all players i and s ′i ∈ Si .
Every finite game has at least one NE in mixed strategies [25].
In this paper we deal with two-player zero-sum games, where
u1(s1, s2) = −u2(s1, s2) for all s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2. The equilibria
of zero-sum games, also called saddle points, have several important
properties, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Minmax Theorem [39]). In a zero-sum game, we have
min
µ1
max
µ2
ui (µ ) = maxµ2 minµ1 ui (µ ) = v .
We call v the value of the game. All equilibria have payoff v .
Moreover, these equilibria µ can be expressed in terms of so-
called maxmin strategies. A maxmin strategy of player 1 is a µˆ1
that solvesminµ2u1(µˆ1, µ2) = v , and a maxmin strategy of player
2 is a µˆ2 that solves minµ1u2(µ1, µˆ2) = v . Any pair of maxmin
strategies of the players is an equilibrium. This directly implies that
equilibrium strategies are interchangeable: if ⟨µ1, µ2⟩ and ⟨µ ′1, µ ′2⟩
are equilibria, then so are ⟨µ ′1, µ2⟩ and ⟨µ1, µ ′2⟩ [28]. Moreover, the
convex combination of two equilibria is an equilibrium, meaning
that the game has either one or infinitely many equilibria.
We will not always be able to compute an exact NE, and so we
employ the standard, additive notion of approximate equilibrium:
Definition 5. Let µ−i denote a strategy of the opponent of player
i . A pair of (possibly pure) strategies (µi , µ−i ) is an ϵ-NE if
∀i ui (µi , µ−i ) ≥ max
µ′i
ui (µ ′i , µ−i ) − ϵ . (1)
In other words, no player can gain more than ϵ by deviating.
In the literature, GANs have not typically been considered as
finite games. The natural interpretation of the standard setup of
GANs is of an infinite game where payoffs are defined over all possi-
ble weight parameters for the respective neural networks. With this
view we do not obtain existence of saddle points, nor the desirable
properties of Theorem 4. Some results on the existence of saddle
points in infinite action games are known, but they require proper-
ties like convexity and concavity of utility functions [5], which we
cannot apply as they would need to hold w.r.t. the neural network
parameters. This is why the notion of local Nash equilibrium (LNE)
has arisen in the literature [32, 38]. Roughly, an LNE is a strategy
profile where neither player can improve in a small neighborhood
of the profile. In finite games every LNE is an NE, as, whenever
there is a global deviation, one can always deviate locally in the
space of mixed strategies towards a pure best response.
3 GANGS
Intuitively, it is clear that GANs are closely related to games, and the
original paper by [14] already points out that G and C essentially
play a minimax game. The exact relation has not been explicitly
described, leading to confusion on whether the sought solution
is a saddle point or not [8]. We set out to address this confusion
by introducing the Generative Adversarial Network Game (GANGs)
formalism, which explicitly phrases adversarial networks as zero-
sum strategic-form games. It builds on the building blocks of regular
GANs, but it emphasizes the fact thatG andC play a zero-sum game,
and formalizes the action space available to these players.
In this section, we provide a ‘fully rational’ formulation of GANGs,
i.e., one where we make no or limited assumptions on the bounded
resources that we face in practice. Bounded resources will be intro-
duced in the next section.
Definition 6. A GANG is a tupleM = ⟨pd , ⟨G,pz ⟩ ,C,ϕ⟩ with
• pd (x) is the distribution over (‘true’ or ‘real’) data points x ∈ Rd .
• G is a neural network class with parameter vector θG ∈ ΘG
and d outputs, such that G(z;θG ) ∈ Rd denotes the (‘fake’ or
‘generated’) output of G on a random vector z drawn from some
distribution z ∼ pz . We will typically leave dependence on the
parameter vector θG implicit and just write G(z).
• C is a neural network class with parameter vector θC ∈ ΘC and
a single output, such that the output C(x ;θC ) ∈ [0, 1] indicates
the ‘realness’ of x according to C . We will interpret it as the
probability that C assigns to a point x being real, even though it
does not need to be a strict probability.
• ϕ is a measuring function [3]: ϕ : [0, 1] → R —typically log,
for GANs, or the identity mapping, for WGANs—that is used to
specify the payoffs of the agents, explained next.
A GANG induces a zero-sum game in an intuitive way:
Definition 7. The induced zero-sum strategic-form game of a
GANG is ⟨D = {G,C}, {SG ,SC } , {uG ,uC }⟩ with:
• SG = {G(·;θG ) | θG ∈ ΘG }, elements of which we denote by sG ;
• SC = {C(·;θC ) | θC ∈ ΘC }, elements of which we denote by sC ;
• The payoff of G, for all (θG ∈ ΘG ,θC ∈ ΘC and their induced)
strategies sG , sC is uG (sG , sC ) = −uC (sG , sC );
• The payoff of the classifier is given by:
uC (sG , sC ) = Ex∼pd [ϕ (sC (x))] − Ez∼pz [ϕ (sC (sG (z)))] .
That is, the score of the classifier is the expected correct classifi-
cation on the real data minus the expected incorrect classification
on the fake data.
In practice, GANs are represented using floating point numbers,
of which, for a given setup, there is only a finite (albeit large)
number. In GANGs, we formalize this:
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Definition 8. AnyGANGwhereG,C are finite classes—i.e., classes
of networks constructed from a finite set of node types (e.g., {Sig-
moid, ReLu, Linear})—and with architectures of bounded size, is
called a finite network class GANG. A finite network class GANG in
which the sets ΘG ,ΘC are finite is called a finite GANG.
From now on, we deal with finite GANGs. These correspond
to finite (zero-sum) strategic games and, as explained earlier, they
will possess one or infinitely many mixed NEs with the same pay-
off. Note that we only point out that finiteness of floating point
systems leads to finite GANGs, but we do not impose any addi-
tional constraints or discretization. Therefore, our finite GANGs
have the same representational capacity as normal GANs that are
implemented using floating point arithmetic.
Zero-sum vs Non-zero-sum. In contrast to much of the GAN-
literature, we explicitly formulate GANGs as being zero-sum games.
GANs [14] formulate the payoff of the generator as a function of
the fake data only: uG = Ez∼pz [ϕ (sC (sG (z)))]. However, it turns
out that this difference typically has no implications for the sought
solutions. We clarify this with the following theorem, and inves-
tigate particular instantiations below. In game theory, two games
are called strategically equivalent if they possess exactly the same
set of Nash equilibria; this (standard) definition is concerned only
about the mixed strategies played in equilibrium and not the result-
ing payoffs. The following is a well-known game transformation
(folklore, see [23]) that creates a new strategically equivalent game:
Fact 9. Consider a game Γ=⟨{1, 2}, {S1,S2}, {u1,u2}⟩. Fix a pure
strategy s2 ∈ S2. Define u¯1 as identical to u1 except that u¯1(si , s2) =
u1(si , s2) + c for all si ∈ S1 and some constant c . We have that Γ and
Γ¯=⟨{1, 2}, {S1,S2}, {u¯1,u2}⟩ are strategically equivalent.
Theorem 10. Any finite (non-zero-sum) two-player game between
G and C with payoffs of the following form:
uG = FakeG (sG , sC ) = −FakeC (sG , sC ),
uC = RealC (sC ) + FakeC (sG , sC ),
is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game where G has payoff
¯uG ≜ −RealC (sC ) − FakeC (sG , sC ).
Proof. By adding−RealC (sC ) to G’s utility function, for each
pure strategy sC of C we add a different constant to all utilities of
G against sC . Thus, by applying Fact 9 iteratively for all sC ∈ SC
we see that we produce a strategically equivalent game. □
Next, we formally specify the conversion of existing GANmodels
to GANGs. We consider the general measure function that covers
GANs and WGANs. In these models, the payoffs are specified as
uG (sG , sC ) ≜ −Ez∼pz [ϕ (1 − sC (sG (z)))] ,
uC (sG , sC ) ≜ Ex∼pd [ϕ (sC (x))] + Ez∼pz [ϕ (1 − sC (sG (z)))] .
These can be written using FakeG (sG , sC ) = −FakeC (sG , sC ) =
−Ez∼pz [ϕ (1 − sC (sG (z)))] andRealC (sC ) = Ex∼pd [ϕ (sC (x))]. This
means that we can employ Theorem 10 and equivalently define a
GANG with zero-sum payoffs that preserves the NEs.
In practice, most work on GANs uses a different objective, in-
troduced by [14]. They say that [formulas altered]: “Rather than
training G to minimize log(1 − sC (sG (z))) we can train G to maxi-
mize log sC (sG (z)). This objective function results in the same fixed
point of the dynamics ofG andC but provides much stronger gradi-
ents early in learning.” This means that they redefine uG (sG , sC ) ≜
Ez∼pz [ϕ (sC (sG (z)))] ,which still can bewritten as FakeG (sG , sC ) =
Ez∼pz [ϕ (sC (sG (z)))]. Now, as long as the classifier’s payoff is also
adapted we can still write the payoff functions in the form of Theo-
rem 10. That is, the trick is compatible with a zero-sum formulation,
as long as it is also applied to the classifier. This then yields the
formulation of the payoffs as used in GANGs (in Def. 7).
4 RESOURCE-BOUNDED GANGS
While GANGs clarify the relation of existing adversarial network
models to zero-sum games, we will not be able to solve them ex-
actly. Even though they are finite, the number of pure strategies
will be huge when we use reasonable neural network classes and
parameter sets. This means that finding an NE, or even an ϵ−NE
will be typically beyond our capabilities. Thus we need to deal with
players with bounded computational resources. In this section, we
propose a formal notion of such ‘bounded rationality‘.
Resource-Bounded Best-Responses (RBBR). A Nash equi-
librium is defined by the absence of better responses for any of
the players. As such, best response computation is a critical tool
to verify whether a strategy profile is an NE, and is also common
subroutine in algorithms that compute an NE. However, like the
computation of an (ϵ-)NE, computing an (ϵ-)best response will gen-
erally be intractable for GANGs. Therefore, to clarify the type of
solutions that we actually can expect to compute with our bounded
computational power, we formalize the notion of resource-bounded
best response and show how it naturally leads to a solution concept
that we call resource-bounded NE (RB-NE).
Definition 11. We say that SRBi ⊆ Si is the subset of strategies
of player i , that i can compute as a best response, given its bounded
computational resources.
This computable set is an abstract formulation to capture phe-
nomena like gradient descent being stuck in local optima, but also
more general reasons for not computing a best response, such as
not even reaching a local optimum in the available time.
Definition 12. A strategy si ∈ SRBi of player i is a resource-
bounded best-response (RBBR) against a (possibly mixed) strategy
sj , if ∀s ′i ∈ SRBi ui (si , sj ) ≥ ui (s ′i , sj ).
That is, si only needs to be amongst the best strategies that
player i can compute in response to sj . We denote the set of such
RBBRs to sj by SRBBR(sj )i ⊆ SRBi .
Definition 13. A resource-bounded best-response function f RBBRi :
Sj → SRBi is a function that maps from the set of possible strategies
of player j to an RBBR for i , s.t. ∀sj f RBBRi (sj ) ∈ S
RBBR(sj )
i .
Now we can define a class of GANGs which are a better model
for games played by neural networks:
Definition 14. A resource-bounded GANG is a tuple
⟨M, { f RBBRд , f RBBRc }⟩ with M a finite GANG as above,
and f RBBRд , f RBBRc the RBBR functions for both players.
For these games, we define an intuitive specialization of NE:
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Definition 15. A strategy profile s = ⟨si , sj ⟩ is a Resource-Bounded
Nash Equilibrium (RB-NE) iff ∀i ui (si , sj ) ≥ ui (f RBBRi (sj ), sj ).
That is, an RB-NE can be thought of as follows: we present s to
each player i and it gets the chance to switch to another strategy, for
which it can apply its bounded resources (i.e., use f RBBRi ) exactly
once. After this application, the player’s resources are exhausted
and if the found f RBBRi (sj ) does not lead to a higher payoff it will
not have an incentive to deviate.
Clearly, an RB-NE can be linked to the familiar notion of ϵ-
NE by making assumptions on the power of the best response
computation.
Theorem 16. If the players are powerful enough to compute an
ϵ-best response function, then an RB-NE for their game is an ϵ-NE.
Proof. Starting from the RB-NE (si , sj ), assume an arbi-
trary i . By definition of RB-NE ui (si , sj ) ≥ ui (f RBBRi (sj ), sj ) ≥
maxs ′i ui (s ′i , sj ) − ϵ . □
Non-deterministic Best Responses. The above definitions as-
sumed deterministic RBBR functions f RBBRi . However, in many
cases the RBBR function can be non-deterministic (e.g., due to ran-
dom restarts), which means that the setsSRBi are non-deterministic.
This is not a fundamental problem, however, and the same approach
can be adapted to allow for such non-determinism. In particular,
now let f RBBRi be a non-deterministic function, and define SRBi
as the (non-deterministic) range of this function. That is, we de-
fine SRBi as that set of strategies that our non-deterministic RBBR
function delivers. Given this modification the definition of the
RB-NE remains unchanged: a strategy profile s = ⟨si , sj ⟩ is a non-
deterministic RB-NE if each player i uses all its computational re-
sources by calling f RBBRi (sj ) once, and no player finds a better
strategy to switch to.
5 SOLVING GANGS
The treatment of GANGs as finite games in mixed strategies opens
up the possibility of extending many of the existing tools and al-
gorithms for these classes of games [12, 13, 30]. In this section, we
consider the use of the Parallel Nash Memory, which is particularly
tailored to finding approximate NEs with small support, and which
monotonically converges to such an equilibrium [27].
Here we give a concise description of a slightly simplified form
of Parallel Nash Memory (PNM) and how we apply it to GANGs.1
For ease of explanation, we focus on the setting with deterministic
best responses.2 The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. Intuitively,
PNM incrementally grows a strategic game SG, over a number of
iterations, using the AugmentGame function. It also maintains a
mixed strategy NE ⟨µG , µC ⟩ of this smaller game at all times. In each
of the iterations it uses a ‘search’ heuristic to deliver new promising
strategies. In our GANG setting, we use the resource-bounded best-
response (RBBR) functions of the players for this purpose. After
having found new strategies, the game is augmented with these
and solved again to find a new NE of the sub-game SG.
1This ignores some aspects of PNM that we do not use, such as ways to ‘discard’ old
strategies [11] that have not been used for a long time.
2 In our experiments, we use random initializations for the best responses. To deal with
this non-determinism we simply ignore any tests that are not able to find a positive
payoff over the current mixed strategy NE ⟨µG , µC ⟩, but we do not terminate. Instead,
we run for a pre-specified number of iterations.
Algorithm 1 Parallel Nash Memory for GANGs
1: ⟨sG , sC ⟩ ← InitialStrategies()
2: ⟨µG , µC ⟩ ← ⟨{sG }, {sC }⟩ ▷ set initial mixtures
3: //Main loop:
4: while not done do
5: sG = RBBR(µC ) ▷ get new bounded best resp.
6: sC = RBBR(µG )
7: //expected payoffs of these ‘tests’ against mixture:
8: uBRs = uG (sG , µC ) + uC (µG , sC )
9: if uBRs ≤ 0 then
10: done← True
11: else
12: SG ← AugmentGame(SG, sG , sC )
13: ⟨µG , µC ⟩ ← SolveGame(SG)
14: end if
15: end while
16: return ⟨µG , µC ⟩ ▷ found an BR-NE
In order to augment the game, PNM evaluates (by simulation)
each newly found strategy for each player against all of the existing
strategies of the other player, thus constructing a new row and
column for the maintained payoff matrix.
In order to implement the best response functions, any existing
neural network architectures (e.g., for GANs) can be used. However,
we need to compute RBBRs against mixtures of networks of the
other player. ForC this is trivial: we can just generate a batch of fake
data from the mixture µG . Implementing a RBBR forG against µC is
slightly more involved, as we need to back-propagate the gradient
from all the different sC ∈ µC to G. In our implementation we
subsample a number of such pure sC and construct a larger network
for that purpose. Better ways of doing this are an interesting line
of future work.
Intuitively, it is clear that PNM converges to an RB-NE, which
we now prove formally.
Theorem 17. If PNM terminates, then it has found an RB-NE.
Proof. We show that uBRs ≤ 0 implies we found an RB-NE:
uBRs = uG (f RBBRG (µC ), µC ) + uC (µG , f RBBRC (µG ))
≤ 0 = uG (µG , µC ) + uC (µG , µC ) (2)
Note that, per Def. 12, uG (f RBBRG (µC ), µC ) ≥ uG (s ′G , µC ) for
all computable s ′G ∈ SRBG (and similar for C). Therefore, the
only way that uG (f RBBRG (µC ), µC ) ≥ uG (µG , µC ) could fail to
hold, is if µG would include some strategies that are not com-
putable (not in SRBG ) that provide higher payoff. However, as
the support of µG is composed of computed (i.e., computable)
strategies in previous iterations, this cannot be the case. As such
we conclude uG (f RBBRG (µC ), µC ) ≥ uG (µG , µC ) and similarly
uC (µG , f RBBRC (µG )) ≥ uC (µG , µC ). Together with (2) this directly
implies uG (µG , µC ) = uG (f RBBRG (µC ), µC ) and uC (µG , µC ) =
uC (µG , f RBBRC (µG )), indicating we found an RB-NE. □
When there are only finitely many pure best responses that we
can compute, as for finite GANGs, the algorithm will terminate.
Moreover, using the same finiteness argument, one can show that
this method monotonically converges to an equilibrium [27].
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Figure 1: Illustration of exploitation of ‘overfitted’ classifier best-response.
Figure 2: Convergence without (left) and with (right) adding
uniform fake data. Shown is payoff as a function of the num-
ber of iterations of PNM: generator (blue), classifier (green),
tests (red). The tests that do not generate positive payoff (red
line < 0) are not added to the mixture.
6 EXPERIMENTS
Herewe report on experiments that aim to test if using existing tools
such as PNM can help in reducing problems with training GANs,
such as missed modes. This is very difficult to asses on complex
data like images; in fact, there is debate about whether GANs are
overfitting (memorizing the data). Assessing this from samples is
very difficult; only crude methods have been proposed e.g., [4].
Therefore, we restrict our proof-of-concept results to synthetic
mixtures of Gaussians for which the distributions can readily be
visualized.
Experimental setup.We compare to a GAN implementation by
Shih [36]. For PNM, we use the same architectures for G and C as
the GAN implementation. The settings for GAN and PNM training
are summarized in Table 1. The mixture components comprise
GAN RBBR
Iterations 2500 1000
Learning Rate 2 · 10−4 10−3
Batch Size 64 128
Measuring Function log 10−5-bounded log
Table 1: Settings used to train GANs and RBBRs.
grids and annuli with equal-variance components, as well as non-
symmetric cases with randomly located modes and with a random
covariance matrix for each mode. For each domain we create test
cases with 9 and 16 components. In our plots, black points are real
data, green points are generated data. Blue indicates areas that are
classified as ‘realistic’ while red indicates a ‘fake’ classification byC .
Plain application of PNM. In GANGs, G informs C about what
good strategies are and vice versa. However, as we will make clear
here, this G has limited incentive to provide the best possible train-
ing signal to C . This is illustrated in Figure 1. The leftmost two
plots show the same best response byC : zoomed in on the data and
zoomed out to cover some fake outliers. Clearly, C needs to really
find creative solutions to try and get rid of the faraway points, and
also do good near the data. As a result, it ends up with the shown
narrow beams in an effort to give high score to the true data points
(a very broad beam would lower their scores), but this exposes C
to being exploited in later iterations: G needs to merely shift the
samples to some other part of the vast empty space around the data.
This phenomenon is nicely illustrated by the remaining three plots
(that are from a different training run, but illustrate it well): the
middle plot shows an NE that targets one beam, this is exploited by
G in its next best response (fourth image, note the different scales
on the axes, the ‘beam’ is the same). The process continues, and
C will need to find mixtures of all these type of complex counter
measures (rightmost plot). This process can take a long time.
PNMwith Added Uniform Fake Data. However, the GANG for-
malism allows us to incorporate a simple way to resolve this issue
and make training more effective. In each iteration, we look at the
total span (i.e., bounding box) of the real and fake data, and we
add some uniformly sampled fake data in this bounded box (we
used the same amount as fake data produced byG). In that way, we
further guide C in order to better guide the generator (by directly
making clear that all the area beyond the true data is fake). The
impact of this procedure is illustrated by Figure 2, which shows the
payoffs that the maintained mixtures µG , µC achieve against the
RBBRs computed against them (so this is a measure of security),
as well as the ‘payoff for tests’ (uBR ). Clearly, adding uniform fake
data leads to much faster convergence.
As such, we perform our main comparison to GANs with this uni-
form fake data component added in. These results are shown in
Figure 3 and 4, and clearly convey three main points: first, the PNM
mixed classifier has a much flatter surface than the classifier found
by the GAN, which is in line with the theoretical predictions about
the equilibrium [14]. More importantly, however, we see that this
flatter surface is not coming at the cost of inaccurate samples. In
contrast: nearly all samples shown are hitting one of the modes and
thus are highly accurate, much more so than the GAN’s samples.
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Figure 3: Results on mixtures with 9 components. Left: PNM, Center: GAN with BN, Right: GAN without BN. True data is
shown in black, while fake data is green.
Finally, except in the 16-component grid plot, we see that the ap-
proach does not suffer from partial mode coverage as it leaves out
no modes. We point out that these PNM results are without batch
normalization, while the GAN results without batch normalization
suffered from many inaccurate samples and severe partial mode
coverage in many cases, as shown in Figures 3 and 4.
Impact of Generator Learning Rate. The above results show
that PNM can accurately cover multiple modes, however, not all
modes are fully covered; some amount of mode collapse still takes
place. As also pointed out by, e.g., [2], the best response ofG against
µC is a single point with the highest ‘realness’, and therefore the
WGAN they introduced uses fewer iterations for G than for C . In-
spired by this, we investigate if we can reduce the mode collapse
by reducing the learning rate ofG (to 10−5). The results in Figure 5
clearly show that more area of the modes are covered confirming
this hypothesis. However, it also makes clear that by doing so, we
are now generating some data outside of the true data. We point
out that also with mode collapse, the PNM mechanism theoreti-
cally could still converge, by adding in more and more delta peaks
covering parts of the modes. In fact, this process in work is already
illustrated in the plots in Figure 3: each plot in the left column
contains at least one true data (black) mode which is covered by
multiple fake data (green) modes. However, if these fake data modes
would be true delta peaks, the number of mixture components re-
quired clearly would be huge, making this infeasible in practice.
As such, this leads to parameter tweaking; investigation of better
solutions is deferred to future work.
7 RELATEDWORK
Progress in zero-sum games. [6] devise a double-oracle algo-
rithm for computing exact equilibria in extensive-form games with
imperfect information. Their algorithm uses best response oracles;
PNM does so too, though in this paper using resource-bounded
rather than exact best responses. Inspired by GANs, [19] deal with
general zero-sum settings with non-convex loss functions. They
introduce a weakening of local equilibria known as smoothed local
equilibria and provide algorithms with guarantees on the smoothed
local regret. In contrast, we work with a generalization of local
equilibrium (RB-NE) that allows for stronger notions of equilib-
rium, not only weaker ones, depending on the power of one’s RBBR
6
Figure 4: Results on mixtures with 16 components. Left: PNM, Center: GAN with BN, Right: GAN without BN. True data is
shown in black, while fake data is green.
Figure 5: Results for PNM with a learning rate of 10−5 for the generator.
functions. For the more restricted class of convex-concave zero-
sum games, it was recently shown that Optimistic Mirror Descent
(a variant of gradient descent) and its generalization Optimistic
Follow-the-Regularized-Leader achieve faster convergence rates
than gradient descent [30, 31]. These algorithms have been explored
in the context of GANs by [10]. However, the convergence results
do not apply as GANs are not convex-concave.
GANs. The literature on GANs has been growing at an incredi-
ble rate, and due to space constraints, we cannot give a full overview
of all the related works, such as [1, 2, 4, 9, 16, 20, 26, 29, 35, 40].
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Instead we refer to [38] for a comprehensive recent overview. That
same paper also introduces Coulomb GANs [38]. As we do here,
the authors show convergence, but for them only under the strong
assumption that the “generator samples can move freely” (which
is not the case when training via gradient descent; samples can
only move small steps). Moreover, their approach essentially per-
forms non-parametric density estimation, which is based on the
(Euclidean) distance between data points, which we believe under-
mines one of the most attractive features of GANs (not needing a
distance metric). Furthermore, it is widely known that using met-
rics in high-dimensional spaces is problematic (i.e., the “curse of
dimensionality”, see, e.g., [18, Sect. 2.5]). Perhaps not surprisingly
Unterthiner et al. report a higher frequency of “generated samples
that are non-sensical interpolations of existing data modes”.
Explicit representations ofmixtures of strategies.Recently,
more researchers have investigated the idea of (more or less) explic-
itly representing a set or mixture of strategies for the players. For
instance, [21] retains sets of networks that are trained by randomly
pairing up with a network for the other player thus forming a GAN.
This, like PNM, can be interpreted as a coevolutionary approach,
but unlike PNM, it does not have any convergence guarantees.
Generally, explicit mixtures can bring advantages in two ways:
(1) Representation: intuitively, a mixture of k neural networks could
better represent a complex distribution than a single NN of the
same size, and would be roughly on par with a single network that
is k times as big. Arora et al. [3] show how to create such a bigger
network using a ‘multi-way selector’. In preliminary experiments
[not reported] we observed mixtures of simpler networks leading to
better performance than a single larger network. (2) Training: Arora
et al. use an architecture that is tailored to representing a mixture
of components and train a single such network. We, in contrast,
explicitly represent the mixture; given the observation that good
solutions will take the form of a mixture, this is a form of domain
knowledge that facilitates learning and convergence guarantees.
The most closely related paper that we have come across is by
Grnarova et al. [15], which also builds upon game theoretic tools to
give certain convergence guarantees. The main differences with our
paper are as follows: 1) We clarify how zero-sum games relate to
original GAN formulation, Wasserstein GAN objectives, and Good-
fellow’s ‘heuristic trick’. 2) We provide a much more general form
of convergence (to an RB-NE) that is applicable to all architectures,
that only depends on the power to compute best responses, and
show that PNM converges in this sense. We also show that if agents
can compute an ϵ-best response, then the procedure converges
to an ϵ-NE. 3) Grnarova et al. show that for a very specific GAN
architecture their Alg. 1 converges to an ϵ-NE. This result is an
instantiation of our more general theory: they assume they can
compute exact (for G) and ϵ-approximate (for C) best responses;
for such powerful players our Theorem 16 provides that guarantee.
4) Their Algorithm 2 does not provide guarantees.
Bounded rationality. The proposed notion of RB-NE is one of
bounded rationality [37]. Over the years a number of different such
notions have been proposed, e.g., see [34, 41]. Some of these also tar-
get agents in games. Perhaps the most well-known such a concept
is the quantal response equilibrium [24]. Other concepts take into
account an explicit cost of computation [17, 33], or explicity limit
the allowed strategy, for instance by limiting the size of finite-state
machines that might be employed [17]. However, these notions are
motivated to explain why people might show certain behaviors or
how a decision maker should use its limited resources. We on the
other hand, take the why and how of bounded rationality as a given,
and merely model the outcome of a resource-bounded computation
(as the computable set SRBi ⊆ Si ). In other words, we make a
minimal assumption on the nature of the resource-boundedness,
and aim to show that even under such general assumptions we can
still reach a form of equilibrium, an RB-NE, of which the quality
can be directly linked (via Theorem 16) to the computational power
of the agents.
8 CONCLUSIONS
We introduced GANGs—Generative Adversarial Network Games—a
novel framework for representing adversarial generative models
by formulating them as finite zero-sum games. The framework
provides strong links to the rich literature in game theory, and
makes available the rich arsenal of game theory solution techniques.
It also clarifies the solutions that we try to find as saddle points in
mixed strategies resolving the possibility of getting stuck in a local
NE. As finite GANGs have extremely large action spaces we cannot
expect to exactly (or ϵ-approximately) solve them. Therefore, we
introduced a concept of bounded rationality, Resource-Bounded
Nash Equilibrium (RB-NE). This notion is richer than the ‘local Nash
Equilibria’ in that it captures not only failures of escaping local
optima of gradient descent, but applies to any approximate best
response computations, including methods with random restarts.
While in GANGs with mixed strategies gradient descent has
no inherent problems (any local NE is a global NE), there are no
known deep learning (i.e., gradient-based) methods to optimize
mixed strategies with very large support sizes. However, in our
RB-NE formulation, we can draw on a richer set of methods for
solving zero-sum games [12, 13, 27, 31]. In this paper, we focus on
PNM, which monotonically converges to an RB-NE, and we em-
pirically investigated its effectiveness in search for good strategies
in a setting where the real data generating process is a mixture of
Gaussians. Our proof-of-concept results demonstrate this method
indeed can deal well with typical GAN problems such as mode
collapse, partial mode coverage and forgetting.
Future work.We presented a framework that can have many
instantiations and modifications. For example, one direction is to
employ different learning algorithms. Another direction could focus
on modifications of PNM, such as to allow discarding “stale” pure
strategies, which would allow the process to run for longer without
being inhibited by the size of the resulting zero-sum “subgame” that
must be maintained and repeatedly solved. The addition of fake
uniform data as a guiding component suggests that there might
be benefit of considering “deep-interactive learning” where there
is deepness in the number of players that interact in order to give
each other guidance in adversarial training. This could potentially
be modelled by zero-sum polymatrix games [7].
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